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                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:   
 
 
 In the context of U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c) which authorizes 
an enhancement of two levels when a defendant is characterized as 
a "supervisor", the question we must answer in this appeal is:  
when is a supervisor not a supervisor?  In the instant case, we 
hold that one is only a "supervisor" under U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c) 
when he is so involved in, and connected to, the illegal activity 
of others that he actually supervises their illegal conduct, and 
is not just a supervisor by virtue of his de jure position in the 
police department hierarchy. 
 
 I. 
 Defendant Thomas DeGovanni was a police sergeant in the 
39th District Five Squad in the city of Philadelphia.  On 
February 25, 1995, he was charged with Conspiracy to Commit 
Offenses Against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§371; Theft Concerning Program Receiving Federal Funds in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §666; Obstruction of Justice in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §1503; and two counts of Interference with 
Interstate Commerce by Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1951.1 
  On April 6, 1995, DeGovanni pled guilty to one count of 
Interference with Interstate Commerce by Robbery and one count of 
Obstruction of Justice.  DeGovanni was sentenced on April 15, 
1996 to 84 months incarceration and a $1,000 fine.  DeGovanni now 
appeals the sentence imposed, on grounds that his sentence was 
improperly enhanced under U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c) for his role as a 
"supervisor". 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
under 18 U.S.C. §3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §1291 and 18 U.S.C. §3742.  Our review of the 
district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is 
plenary, and we review the underlying factual findings for clear 
error.  See United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 1032 (1996); United States v. 
Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1401 (3d Cir. 1992).   Here, because there 
is no factual dispute concerning DeGovanni's role as a supervisor 
in the police department or about the nature of his activities 
                     
1.  These charges stem from DeGovanni's alleged participation in 
a conspiracy with fellow police officers from 1988 until 1995, in 
which the co-conspirators engaged in activities such as 
assaulting drug suspects, conducting illegal searches, 
fabricating evidence, illegally seizing money from suspected drug 
dealers, and making arrests without probable cause. 
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within the conspiracy, we will exercise plenary review to 
determine whether §3B1.1(c) should apply to the facts in this 
case, so as to enhance DeGovanni's sentence two levels.  
 
 II. 
 The sole question in this appeal is whether defendant 
DeGovanni, who served as a sergeant in the 39th District Five 
Squad, should be considered a supervisor in criminal activity - 
an activity which involved members of the Philadelphia police 
force, but did not require that he, DeGovanni, play an active, 
supervisory role in the criminal offenses committed. 
 The government charges that DeGovanni's failure to 
report and otherwise deter his subordinates from engaging in 
criminal misconduct, constituted the supervision to which 
§3B1.1(c) refers.  The government claims that "...DeGovanni can 
best be described as agreeing to go along with and profit[ing] 
from - as opposed to actually directing - the criminal conduct to 
which he has admitted."  Brief of Appellant DeGovanni at 7, 
quoting Presentence Memorandum of Government (Exhibit A at 3).  
As such, the government argues that, by virtue of DeGovanni's 
supervisory title and responsibilities as sergeant, DeGovanni was 
a supervisor within the meaning of §3B1.1(c). 
 DeGovanni, on the other hand, asserts that he was no 
more than a de jure supervisor in the 39th District Five Squad, 
and did not actively participate in the criminal activities out 
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of which the charges arose.  Indeed, in his brief on appeal, 
DeGovanni characterizes his involvement as no more than passive. 
 He argues that, although he was a sergeant in the police 
department, he did not supervise or manage his co-conspirators 
during the commission of their crimes.  Although he admits 
participation in, and profiting from, the criminal activities, he 
contends that he played a secondary role, and that he was a mere 
'rank and file' participant.  See Brief of Appellant DeGovanni at 
12-14.   
 DeGovanni further argues that his failure to report his 
co-conspirators, although violative of his police oath and his 
responsibilities as a sergeant, was not a decision motivated by 
concerns for the group, and did not further the group's 
activities.  Finally, he claims that he "did not manage, direct, 
supervise, or lead the others or decide when, where or how the 
crimes with which he and the others were charged would be 
committed.  The Government concedes as much in its sentencing 
memorandum".  Id. at 12, citing Exhibit A at 1-3. 
 The district court held that DeGovanni's participation 
in the conspiracy, coupled with his failure to report the 
activities of his co-conspirators, served to facilitate the 
commission of the crimes and was an abdication of his supervisory 
responsibility as a police sergeant.  See Transcript of Hearing 
(App. 24a-27a; 31a-32a).  Applying the recommendation of the 
Probation Department in the pre-sentence report and overriding 
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DeGovanni's objections, the court enhanced DeGovanni's sentence 
by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c).2   
 
 III. 
 We hold that the district court improperly enhanced 
DeGovanni's sentence.  U.S.S.G. §3B1.1 provides,  
 
3B1.1. Aggravating Role 
 
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the 
offense level as follows: 
 
(a)  If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal 
activity that involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive, 
increase by 4 levels. 
 
(b)  If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an 
organizer or leader) and the criminal 
activity involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive, 
increase by 3 levels. 
 
(c)  If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or 
supervisor in any criminal activity 
other than described in (a) or (b), 
increase by 2 levels. 
 
 
 The Guidelines (in each of its three sub-sections) call 
for a determination of whether the defendant was a supervisor in 
the criminal activity.  Courts which have addressed the issue of 
                     
2.  Prior to the enhancement, the Guideline range was 63-78 
months (offense level of 26 and criminal history category I).  
After the enhancement, the range became 78-97 months (offense 
level of 28 and criminal history category I).  DeGovanni was 
sentenced to 84 months. 
  
 
 7 
supervision have required that, to be a supervisor, there must be 
some degree of control over others involved in the commission of 
the offense.  See e.g., United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 
524 (10th Cir. 1993), aff'd after remand 43 F.3d 1484 (10th Cir. 
1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1417 (1995); United States v. 
Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1990).  More specifically, 
the Guidelines direct that a defendant's role in the criminal 
activity is the operative issue.  Here, DeGovanni's sergeant-
status in the police department as an overall supervisor of other 
police officers in the discharge of general police functions, was 
not enough to substantiate an enhancement for active supervision 
of other members of the conspiracy under §3B1.1(c).  See United 
States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 504 
U.S. 977 (1992) (sentences should not be enhanced under §3B1.1(c) 
unless the defendant supervised or managed the actions of another 
individual in the criminal enterprise); see generally, United 
States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1992) (§3B1.1 
enhancements apply to supervision of others in group activities). 
 Just as a defendant bank director in United States v. Jobe, ___ 
F.3d ___, No. 94-50646, 1996 WL 700146 at *17 (5th Cir., December 
5, 1996), could not have his sentence enhanced for check kiting 
and bank fraud because he did not manage or supervise the 
criminal activity of check kiting, no more can DeGovanni have his 
sentence enhanced because of his general overseer role as 
sergeant. 
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 We reject the government's contention that DeGovanni's 
status as a sergeant is relevant simply because the offenses at 
issue were committed by police officers, acting "in their 
capacities as Philadelphia Police Officers".  Brief of Appellee 
United States at 9.  Although the defendants used their official 
positions as cover for the illegal acts, the mere fact that 
DeGovanni was their workplace supervisor, is not enough to render 
him more culpable for purposes of the conspiracy than the other 
'rank and file' participants.  We find that the enhancement 
contained in U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c) does not apply absent such 
heightened culpability, and that one must therefore have an 
active supervisory role in the actual criminal conduct of others 
to justify the enhancements contained in this section of the 
Guidelines. 
 We hold that DeGovanni's sentence which included a two-
level enhancement for his activities as a supervisor was not 
warranted.   DeGovanni's 'rank and file' participation in the 
criminal activity constituted mere participation, and nothing 
more.  His activities mirrored those of the other low-level 
participants; his role was clearly distinguishable from primary 
players in the conspiracy such as John Baird3, and the evidence 
of record does not support DeGovanni's role as a manager or 
supervisor of the illegal activities engaged in by other police 
officers.   
                     
3.  This defendant appears before us in a separate appeal, United 
States v. John Baird, No. 96-1342. 
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 The only activity that distinguishes DeGovanni from 
other participants was his silence -- he fulfilled his duties as 
a sergeant in the police force without reporting the illegal, 
extracurricular activities of his inferior officers.4  Such 
silence, although reprehensible, does not make him a "supervisor" 
of the charged criminal activity for purposes of §3B1.1(c).5 
 
 IV. 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's 
sentence which included a two-level enhancement under §3B1.1(c) 
and remand for resentencing consistent with the foregoing 
opinion. 
                     
4.  The government has alleged that these activities included the 
"creation of official police paperwork, the preparation for 
testimony in court, and the documentation and handling of seized 
money".  Brief of Appellee Government at 10, referring to 
Transcript of Hearing (App. 29a). 
5.  The "background" section of the Application Notes explains 
that enhancement for supervision is appropriate because it is 
"likely that persons who exercise a supervisory or managerial 
role in the commission of an offense tend to profit more from it 
and present a greater danger to the public and/or are more likely 
to recidivate."  Application Notes to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1.  None of 
these concerns apply to DeGovanni. 
